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A large share of production is carried out by state-owned enterprises. Traditionally
governments provide a large share of education, health services, road construction and mainte-
nance. In addition, governments in many countries run essemially commercial enterprises that
primarily sell goods and services. This type of (non-financial) government activity accounted for a
weighted average of 4.9 percem of GDr in 8 indusiriaiized wunirics du~i~~g t;;e i978-1991 pericd,
while for 40 developing countries the average was 10.7 percent.' Reflecting considerable variation
among industrialized countries, the government production share was 18.2 percent for Portugal,
and 1.2 percent for the United States. Many government activities in principle can be carried out by
the private sector, and in recent years there has been a strong movement towards privatizing
government enterprises. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the share of government production
fell from 6.6 percent in 1982 to 1.9 percent in 1991. After the fall of communism, the countries of
Eastern Europe, of course, have been on a path of wholesale privatization. These trends reflects the
feeting that privatization yields efficiency and welfare gains. Several studies, as surveyd by
Boardman and Vining ( 1989), provide evidence that state-owned enterprises perform substantially
worse than similar private firms.Z
This paper considers a model where government and private production coexist. Specifi-
cally, there is a range of production activities that in principle can be carried out by either the
government or the private sector. The activities differ in the relative efficiency with which the
government and the private sector can carry them out. Some activities, specifically, yield more
output for given inputs when carried out by the government, and vice versa. The comparative
advantage the government and the private sector have in carrying out certain activities depends,
among other things, on production externalities if any, the public goods nature of the output, the
feasibility of contracts in the private sector and, fmally, the market structure that prevails in the
private sector scenario.' The government can alter the range of government activities by privatizat-
ions or instead by take-overs. Private production also differs from public production in that it is
subject to a distorting investment tax. [n addition, the government has access to saving taxation and
some taxation of private profits. In this setting, the government jointly sets the range of state
production activities, physical investment in these activities, and tax policy. The optimal range of
government activities is shown to depend on the relative efficiency (or wastefulness) of government
production as well as on the distortions created by the investment tax. Further, the required rate of
return on investment in public activities is shown to generally be less than that in private firms, but
1greater than the net return to saving.
The benchmark model is of a small open economy that takes the external cost of capital as
given. This analysis yields several interesting insights. First, the range of government activities is
chosen efficiently (in the sense that the state and private sectors each carry out the activities they
have an absolu[e advantage in), if the government can iaise all required revenues through the
.. . ~--.,--n.. r............. ...,.,o..,...o.,r V.oc rn lnv., nnc;r;vn ;m,vcrm nt anri
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saving taxes. [n this instance, the scale of the state sector is positively related to the optimal private
investment tax rate. The reason is that a higher taxation of private activity reduces the value of
having borderline activities carried out by the private sectoc As a result, the government takes on
some activities that it has an absolute disadvantage in (ignoring taxes). The positive link between
the investment tax and the scope for government production implies that everything that causes a
higher investment tax also causes a larger state sector. Stronger preferences for public goods, for
instance, result in higher tax levels and a larger state sector.
The paper also considers the case of a closed economy where the cost of capital reflects the
internal saving-investment balance. Again, the size of the govertunent sector is efficient, if the
government can raise all required revenues through the nondistorting profit tax. With strong
preferences for public goods, however, the government is required to impose a capital income tax
that causes a wedge between the gross return to private investment and the net return to private
saving. With such a distorting tax in place, the goverrtment faces a shadow price of capital in
between the gross return to capital in the private sector and the net-of-tax return received by savers.
The fact that the private and public perceived costs of capital differ again provides the goverttment
with the incentive to expand the government sector. As a result, also in the closed economy the
government takes on some activities where it has an absolute production disadvantage, if in fact
distorting capital income taxation is used.
An extensive literature (see, for instance, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a,b), Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1972), Sandmo and Drèze (197]), Hagen (1988) and Stiglitz (1982)) has considered
optimal taxation given joint public and private production in two separate sectors or firms. Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971a) specifically show that the optimal tax scheme implies overall production
efficiency in the presence of a full set of consumption taxes. In the present paper, similarly there is
overaH production efficiency if private sector profit tax revenues suffice. A focus of the earlier
literature, and in particular of Sandmo and Drèze (1971), has been the appropriate social discount
rate or shadow price of capital for public investment. The present paper similarly is concerned with
2the appropriate level of public investment given the range of public production activities. As in the
eartier work, the implications of public investment for private investment and saving - and for tax
revenues - are of considerable interest in [he case of a closed economy. The main focus of the
paper, however, is on the joint determination of the range of public activities and tax policy. This
analysis yields interesting insights also for the case of a small open economy, where the shadow
price of public capital is trivially equal to the international interest rate.
As a related matter, Bolton and Roland (1992) have previously considered how privatizat-
ions should be carried out so as [o minimize the subsequent need for the government to raise
revenue through distorting taxation. Specifically, they argue that the government may wish to
consider non-cash bids at privatization auctions (in the form of debt or equity stakes in the newly
privatized firms). This way, the government can realize some of the efficiency advantages of
privatization without a need to impose undesirably high taxes on the newly created private firms.
Laban and Wolf (1993), Roland and Verdier (1994) and others further address the coordination and
other problems associated with large-scale privatizations, as they have taken place in Eastern
Europe.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model of the
optimal range of state production for the case of a small open economy. Section 3 extends the open
economy model to include the foreign ownership of domestic private firms. Section 4 considers the
range of government activities in a closed economy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The smaG open economy
To start, we consider a two-period framework for a small open economy that is 6nancially
well integrated with the rest of the world. The domestic interest rate equals the exogenously given
world interest rate, r. The economy can produce a single good by way of a range of production
activities or projects with a total volume of unity. All production activities can in principle be
carried out by either the public or the private sector. The continuum of production activities are
indexed by a waste parameter t~ with support [J GSJ, where we assume that a1 G 0 c ia." The
waste parameter t~ has a density function h(w), and a corresponding distribution function N(ai). A
projec['s output, if carried out by the private sector, is characterized by a strictly concave produc-
tion function, F(KJ, where K is first-period project-specific investment and F(K) is the project's
second-period outpuL The project's output, if carried out by the public sector, is given by (I - w)
F(K), where rv is the project-specific waste parameter. Clearly for activities with ~~ 0, the private
3sector has an absolute production advantage, and vice versa. The waste parameter is short-hand for
the fact that economic sectors differ in the extent of technological externalities, the degree to which
the output is a public good, and the market structure Iif privately organized). Below, the govern-
ment optimally specializes in the range of activities with the lowest waste parameters. Of interest is
the marginal public project, with waste parameter b, that demarcates the public and private sectors.
Production efficiency requires that 41 - U so tha[ each sec[or carries out the proàuction aciiviiics
where it has an absolute efficiency advantage. With ~ 1 0(GS c 0) instead, the government sector
is "too large" ("too small") in that the public (private) sector carries out some activities where it has
an absolute efficiency disadvantage. The range of public activities, and thus ~, is affected by the
privatization of public activities or by the public take-over of previously private projec[s. To
account for such privatizations or take-overs, let bo be the waste parameter of the original marginal
public production activity. We will assume that d s ~o so that indeed there are privatizations.
In the first period, the representative agent receives an endowment of the single good
denoted Y. These resources are divided between first-period consumption, C~, and saving, S. In the
second period, there is private consumption, C2, and consumption of a public good, G. This public
good is a one-to-one transformation of the single produced good; it does not affect production
possibili[ies, nor the marginal rate of substitution between first and second period consumption. To
finance this public good, the government can impose a private investment tax at a rate v, and a
saving tax at a rate u, both payable in the second period. In addition, second-period profits are
taxed at a rate z. We assume the investment tax is deductible from taxable profits. Profits can be
thought to reflect some project-specific fixed factor such as land or labor. The feasible profit tax, z.
is assumed to be limited to the range 0 s z s z c l. The upper limit on the profit tax may have to
do with institutional constraints precluding complete taxation of profits.
The ordering of events is as follows. First, [he government decides on the extent of
privatization, on tax rates, and on investment in public activities. Next, private agents make their
saving and investment decisions. Finally in the second period, the government receives the payment
for privatized projects, and production and consumption of private and public goods take place. As
indicated, with LS c ~o the goverrunent privatizes some public activities. In return, the government
receives a second-period payment, P, from the representative household. This payment equals the
after-tax profits the private sector can obtain from carrying out the newly privatized activities (given
the investment and profit taxes) as follows,
4P - (a - ó) (1 - z) [F(Ko) - (1 ' r ` v) KrJ
v
(1)
where o - ~ H(o) and ~ - 1 - H(GP) are the shares of projects in private hands after and
before privatization (or loosely speaking the post- and pre-privatization sizes of the private sector),
and where Ko is the private capital investment at any private-sector project.
p us` rep....,-..'~- TÍIC iwV ~iivd b"a~~' w..o.,...... of the rncPntatiyr hnncehnld Can nttw he stated as
follows,
Ci 5(I t r - u) (Y~ - C~) t o(I - z)[F(Kp) -(1 r r t v)KpJ - P (2)
Second-period consumption, C1, thus reflects first-period saving, second-period after-tax
profits and [he payment to [he government for any privatized activities.
The government's second-period budget constraint is as follows,
G c u S t o[z [F(Ko) -(1 t r t v) KPJ ' v KPJ '
0
~(I - c~) F(Kz(r~)) -( I . r) Kg(rv)J h(td)drv t P (3)
where Kg(ce) is the investment at a particular government-sector project. On the income side in
(3), the government receives saving, profit and investment tax revenues and the profits from
government-run activities plus the sales receipts from privatized activities.
Using the expression for P in (1), the government's net gain from privatization can be
w~ritten as follows,
(a -~)[F(Kp) -( ~ `r)KoJ
00
- ~(1 - ~)F(Kg(rv)) - ( 1 ' r)Kg(td)J h(c~)dtd
JD-
(4)
Following privatization, the government receives the sum of the sales revenues, P, in (3)
and the investment and profit taxes levied on the privatized entities. This sum simply equals the
entire pre-tax profits from the privatized activities as reflected in (4). In return, the government has
to forego the profits it would obtain from running the privatized projects itself.
5The lifetime utility function has the additive form given by UIC„ C2) f V(G). In the first
period, the representative household decides on its saving and on the private sector investment level
given rise to the following familiar optimality conditions:
U, -(1 t r- u) Uz (5)
F~(K~) -(I t r f v) - 0 (6)
Eq. (6) immediately implies that the investment Ko is negatively related to v for any priva[e-
sector project.
Aggregate private and public investments, Ko and Kk, are given by,
KP - a Ko
Kg - ~KR(cd)h(ru)drv (8)
Let us define F(Kg D) to be the maximum public output for a given aggregate govern-
ment capital K~ and projects with waste parameters ril F[t~, DJ in the state sector. Note that
maximizing government output F (K~, D) (for a given capital stock KR) implies that the waste-
inclusive marginal product of capital, (! -~) F(Kg(r~)), is constant for all government projects.
Specifically, we have (! - r~) F'(Kg(r,~)) -(1 -D)F'(Kg(D)) - dF(K~, D)~dKg for all co s D.
This implies that the level of public investment, Kg(t.i), for any government activity ai can be
written as Ke (r,i) - (F')-~((1 -D)F'(Kg(D)))~(! -rv) given an investment, ~(~), in the marginal
public project with waste parameter 4. This formulation immediately implies that the public
investment, KA(t,i), is negatively related to the waste parameter, rv. This is illustrated in Figure 1. In
the figure, the level of investment, Kn, at any private project is constant for any m~ D.
Against this background and given eq. (5) and (6), the government wishes to maximize the
utility of the representative household subject to its budget constraint in (3). The government's
choice variables are taken to be the tax rates u and v, the volume of public goods, Q the marginal
activity in the public sector, 6i, the investment level in the marginal public activity KB(t3), and the
profit tax ~. The goverrtment's problem corresponds to the following Lagrangean,
6L- U(C~, (Y~ - C~1 (1 w r - u) r o(1 - z) [F(Kp) -( 1 ri r r v) Kpj - P I '
V(G) ~~(uS ~~ Q(z[F(Ko) -(1 t r ~ v)KpJ ~ vKoJ
0
~(1 - ro) F(KR(cuJ) -( I t r) K~(~)J h(c~)dm ~ P - G) (9)
~
where ~ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint.`
The first order conditions with respect to u, v, t,ï, Ky(6i), and G can be stated as follows,
- Uz rt ~(1 - ue") - 0 (10)
- U~(~ - zl ' ~((i - z1 ( ~ ' uv) -Pe~r') - ~ (11)
(1 - D) F(KR(Ol1 - (~ ' r) Kg(Q) - CF(K~1 - (~ ' r) K~I - 0 (12)
(1 - D1 F~(KR(~)) - (1 ` r) - 0 (13)
V(G) -.i - 0 (14)
where e --dSls ~ 0 is the uncompensated semi-elasticity of saving with respect to the tax rate
" du
u (which is asswned positive at a maximum in ( 10)). e --dKIK ~ 0 is the semi-elasticity of
dv
private investment with respect to the tax v, and p is the marginal propensity to consume in the first
period out of second-period income. Further, the parameter p - aola~" is the post-privatization size
of the private sector relative to the pre-prívatization size of the private sector. Accordingty, a value
of p exceeding unity points at ongoing privatization, and vice versa.
We can solve for the optimal saving tax, u, and the optimal investment tax, v, from (10)
and ( I I) as follows,
u - ~ (~ - ~ )
e" n
v-! z(1 y P
1(~ - II
P e, e" ~J
(15)
(16)
7where r~ -.ii U: is the marginal cost of funds. At the same time, the optimal saving and invest-
ment taxes are related to each other as follows,
(1 - z) e„`
v - u (17)
wiic[c e~ - e~ ~ p iS thC wmpC.~Sated ~.,.,.. ela.,., ity vf s... ng ..ah . spe,. .., t!:e fax .. NnfP
from (16) and (17) that the greater is the extent of ongoing privatization, the smaller is the incentive
for the government to utilize the investment tax. To see this, note from (12) that a higher invest-
men[ tax imposed on newly privatized activities in fact reduces the privatization selling price by
more than the additional investment tax revenues, as a higher investment tax further distorts the
post-privatization investment choice.
Let us now consider the optimal range of production activities in the public sector. First, let
us consider that the feasible profit tax revenues are sufficient to finance the optimal volume of
government spending. In this instance, the marginal cost of funds r, -.iI Ul is unity. Eq. (15) and
(16) then immediately imply that the saving tax, u, and investment tax, v, are optimally set to zero,
while eq. ( 12) then yields that the optimal marginal waste parameter, D also is equal to zero. In
this case, the public and private sector each carry out the activities where they have an absolute
efficiency advantage, and overall production efficiency prevails. Next, let us consider that the
available profit tax revenues are insufficient to finance the optimal provision of public goods. In this
case, the profit tax, z, equals the maximum profit rate, á, and the marginal cost of public funds, r),
exceeds unity, and both the saving and investment taxes, u and v, are positive in (15) and (16). For
this case, we can show:~
Proposirion 1. In the open economy, the optimal privatization choice implies
(i) D~ n if p~ I,
(ii) Kg(D~ ~ Ko if r) ~ 1,
(ii) ~ and ~ are positively rela[ed.
For a proof, see the Appendix. Part (i) of the proposition indicates that the government
sector is "too large" with r) 7 1, as the public sector has taken over some activities from the
private sector where the public sector has an absolute efficiency disadvantage. The government
sector is expanded to the point where D~ o to balance the distortion of private investment with a
8positive investment tax, v.' Following eq. 12, the surplus (1 - oi)F(Kx(cw)) -(l t rJKR(tSJ for the
marginal puhlic activity equals the surplus F(Ky) -(I -F r)K, for any private activity, as indicated by
the two shaded areas in Figure 2. Note that parts 1 - z and z of the private-sector surplus, i.e. (1 -
zJ(F(Ko) -(I t r f v)Kp) and z(F(Kr) -(1 ~- r f v)Kr), accrue to the private and government
sectors as after-tax profit income and profit tax revenues, respectively.
Part (ii) of the proposition states that with n 1 1 the eoverrunent invests mnre in the
marginal pubtic project than the private sector, i.e. Ke(t5) ~ Ko, as illustrated in Figure 3. In the
figure, K~(Gi) maximizes the surplus (I - t3)F(K) -(~ f- r)K, equal to the tax-ridden surplus, F(f4,) -
(1 f r)K~, attained at any private activity. Private investors instead choose, KA, to maximize the
expression F(K~,) -(1 t r t v)!4„ and thus I~ c l~ ([.i). The result implies that the invesnnent tax,
r, distorts private investment more than the waste parameter, D, distorts the public investment in
the marginal public project." Part (iii), finally, indicates that the waste parameter of the marginal
puhlic project. ~J, and thus the size of the state production sector, are posi[ively related to the
optimal investment tax, v. The reason is that a higher and thus more distorting investment tax
increases the relative overall efficiency of public vs. private production.
Part (iii) of proposition 1 has the important implication that factors that lead to a higher
optimal investment tax also lead [o a larger optimal state production sector. This enables us to show
the following:
Proposiriou 2.
(i) For given values of e~`, (1 -;)~e,., ar.d p, a higher value ef r) leads to lar~er u, :~ and Q.
(ii) For given values of e„`, p, 11, a higher value of j1 - zÍiK increases v and Q while u remains
the same.
(iii) For given values of (1 - zJle,., p, and t), a higher value of e~` reduces u and v and b.
Part (i) indicates that stronger preferences for public goods, as proxied by a higher value of
r), lead to a larger state production sector. To see this, note that the saving and investment taxes, u
and r, increase with r) in (15) and ( l6). The result then follows by applying part (iii) of proposition
I. Part (iil states that a higher value of (1 - z)~e,., for instance through a lower value of z, leads to a
larger state sector. With a lower profit tax rate z, the investment tax, t~, is higher in (Ití), which
reflects that the investment tax acts as a second-best tax on private-sector profits. The result then
again follows by applying part (iii) of proposition l. Finally, part (iii) sta[es that a higher compen-
9sated saving semi-elasticity, e~~, leads to a smaller sta[e sector. To see this, no[e equation ( 16) and
part (iii) of proposition 1.
To conclude this section, consider the possibility that the state sector becomes more
productive or - equivalendy - less wasteful. In particular, consider an increase in the efficiency of
government production, as indicated by smaller waste parameters c,i for public activities with
r.~ ~~ n Frnm f31. we see that this nuhlic sectnr efficienry oain ic enitivalrnt rn a I~~mp c,~m
expansion of government resources, as it increases the profits the government derives from
operating its production activities. Such a revenue expansion causes a reduction in the marginal cost
of public funds, r). The government can then lower the saving and investment tax rates, u and v,
and the marginal waste parameter ~. An increase in the efficiency of government production thus,
somewhat paradoxically, may lead to a reduction in the size of the government sector.
3. Internationa! ownership of private firms
The government's privatization decision generally balances the welfare losses stemming
from the taxation of private ínvestment against the relative inefficiency of (marginal) government
production. These welfare losses, of course, are substantially mitigated if domestic projects or firms
are pardy foreign-owned, in which case the incidence of investment taxation is partly on the foreign
owners of domestic firms. To examine this, this section introduces foreign ownership of domestic
projects or firms, following Huizinga and Nielsen (forthcoming).9 In particular, we assume that a
share a of all private sector projects is owned by foreigners. In case of privatization, foreign
residents also purchase a share a of the equity of any newly privatized firms. The second-period
budget constraint of the domestic representative agent then is modified as follows,
C1 ~(1 t r - uJ (Y~ - C~ r o(I - a)(1 - z)!F(KP) -(1 ' r' v)1ce1
(1 - a) P ; R (18)
where R is taken to be the symmetric, after-tax receipts domestic agents receive from their
ownership of any foreign private firms.





10From (19), we see that a higher foreign ownership share, a, causes [he government to shift
the stress from saving to investment taxatíon. In particular, a higher value of a leads to a higher
value of v, for a given value of r) (and thus u) if we assume I- e~`u ~ 0. For a given value of r), a
larger foreign ownership share, a, then also causes a larger state production sector as proxied by GS.
A larger foreign ownership share a, however, reduces the cost of public funds, precisely because
nart nf thv inri~iPnrv nf rhe imrPCtmanr r~r .v ' nn f.,~Ain,. n.,,.,o.~ ThiS a..~" tO iG'w T,iC ' r~.. .,. -...-.~-..-- ....-......-....~,. n0 .. ... .... .......b...,.......~. w,...o Ci v. uu
effect on the inves[ment tax rate is, however, ambiguous.
4. The closed economy
In the closed economy, the cost of capi[aI no longer can be taken as given, but ra[her ref-
lects the private supply of saving and the aggregate private and public demand for investment. [n
this setting, the government has to take into account how its demand for investment funds affects
the general equilibrium in the economy including its saving, investment and profit tax revenues.
This section investigates the joint government tax, public investment and privatization decisions for
this case. The government is shown to face a shadow cost of capital between the gross return to
investment in the private sector and the net-of-tax return to savings. The perceived private and
public costs of capital thus are different. From the public perspective, this perceived difference in
costs of capital is a distortion which can be corrected by expanding the public sector. Optimally,
therefore, the government sector expands, and the government takes on activities where it has an
absofute production disadvantage. As in the open economy, the government sector will be "too
large".
ln the closed economy, the tax authority has a single tax instrument, x, to introduce a
wedge between the gross return to investment and the net return to saving. In particular, a single
tax x can be thought to be levied on the return to saving. As a result,the net-of-tax return to saving
is r- x, while r is the return to investment. Again, there is a profit tax z with o s z s á ~ 1, and
K~ and F~ (c.i) are the private and public project-specific investments. With aggregate private and
public investments KP and Í~, the saving-investment balance implies that KP rt Kg - S. Again, we
denote by F(KR, rv) maximum public output from the aggregate government capital KR. As before,
an efficient allocation of KR over the range of public projects is a fortiori governed by Kg(D~ given
The government's optimization problem is gíven by the following Lagrangean:
11L- U(C„ (Y - CrJ p f r-.x) f a~ (1 - z) [F(K~ -(1 f r)KoJ - P) t V(G) f
~(x S f ap z[F(K~ -(1 f r)K~,J t F(Kq, rv) -(1 t r)KQ f P- G) (20)
The Qovernment's choice variables are x, K~(till. t3, and G(for a eiven value of rl. The
corresponding first order conditions are:
-Uzl 1 - rcg
drl
l dxJ
xe -K dr -n
' R dx
U S ié
dr t~ dK8 dF
~ a
dKg(DI dKg(Dl ( dKg
U SK dr t z RdD
-(1 ' rJ I t d~g(D~ S(xe~ - go)
(2f)
- 0 (22)
~~DS(xe~ -K~f th(D)[(I -D)F(Kg(D)J -(1 tr)Kg(D) -F(K~ t(1 tr)KpJ~-O (23)
~~(G)-,1-0 (24)
where eu~ - G, f p(1-Z)~ "~ IS and x~ - 1 -(1 - z) oó KF IS, with (! - z) ~ KP I S being the
effective, after-profit-tax share of capital owned by the private sector with no privatization.
In these expressions, e~ --(dSI d.r)!S is the semi-elasticity of saving with respect to the
tax wedge, x, accounting for any endogenous change in the interest rate. The semi-elas[icity er can




e~ - p(1 - z)
~S e dx





so that e, can be written as,
(25)
(26)
12K e e p v u
0
Kpe~ f Se„
which is positive with e~ ~ 0. Using the saving-invesnnent balance, we can also find that,
dr - ! dKe dr - h(D~ Kg (D7 -Kp
dK8(D) Kpey - Se~ dKR(D)~ dD Kpe~ r Se~
(27)
as [hey appear in (24) and (25).
Using expressions (21), (22), (26) and (27), we relate the optimal saving tax, x, and the
optimal waste-inclusive marginal product of public capi[al, dFqidKg, and the marginal waste
parameter, D, to the marginal cost of funds, 1), as follows,
. x - - 1
e e e
1
('P vZ)~e l tll
dFR e~`





(1 - ol F(Kg(Dl) - F(xpJ - ~i ~ r - (!
I ~ (1 -') e~
rl Pe~e~
(29)
(Kg(D) - Kp) (30)
Expression (28) immediately shows that x~ 0 as q-!. Other things equal, ongoing
privatization, with p exceeding unity, reduces the optímal tax wedge, x, as a higher saving-
investment tax wedge discourages any post-privatization investment. In (29), the left hand side is
the marginal product of capital in the public sector. This is set equal to the shadow cost of public
capital on the right hand side of (29). Note that this shadow cost of public capital is bounded by the
cost of capital in the private sector, i.e. 1 f r, and the net-of-tax return to savings, i.e. ! t r- x, if
r) ~ 1. As a matter of fact, the shadow cost of public capital, dF~dKR, can be written in the form
of a weighted average of the private cost of capital, ! t r, and the net return to saving ! t r-.r,
with weights equal to [pe,l(pe~ f (1 - z)e„)J and [(1 - z)e~`~(pe~ t(I - z)e„`)J, respectively. This
weighted average formula is a generalization of the main result in Sandmo and Dreze (1971) (as
seen in their eqn. (20)) so as to include both profit taxation and some ongoing privatization. From
(29), we see that the higher the rate of profit taxation, z, and the larger the relative post-privatiza-
tion private sector, q the closer will the shadow cost of public capital, dF~dKg, will be to the
private cost of capital, 1 t r."' Interestingly, the shadow price of public capital in the open
economy, equal to ! f r, can be written as a weighted average of the marginal productivity of
13capital in private activities, 1 f r f v, and the net return to saving, I t r - u, with equal weights
as in (29j.
Next, let us turn to the optimal size of the state production sector. As before, we can
distinguish the cases where the profit tax, z, is not strictly bound by its upper limit á. [n [he first
case with r) - 1, equation (2A) yields tha[ .i - 0, while equations (29) and (30) joindy yield
Kx(cJ) - Kn and D - o so that there is overall production efficiency in the economy. Next, with
11 1 I we tind,
Proposirion .3. In the closed economy with 1) ~ 1, we have (i) D~ r7 and (iij Kg(Gi) ~ Kp.
For a proof, see the Appendíx. The proposition implíes that with distorting capital income
taxation the government sector will be "too large" as the government expands into activities where
it has an absolute production disadvantage. By expanding the government sector, the government
coun[ers the distortion created by the fact that the private cost of capital is higher than the shadow
cost of public capital on the right hand side of (29). As a result, the private sector invests too little
from the public perspective, and the marginal product of capital in the private sector exceeds [he
marginal product of capital in the public sector. The optimal size of the government sector balances
the benefits for the goverrunent of being able to set investment volume against the production
disadvantage vis-à-vis the private sector for any marginal public project. Note that proposition 3
exactly corresponds to parts (i) and (ii) of proposition 1. The government sector thus will optimally
be "too large" regardless of whether the interest rate is given exogenously or determined
endogenously through savings.
5. ConcLision
This paper has shown that the optima! range of public production activities and tax policy
are closely related. In any privatization decision, the government in effect trades off the relative
efficiency of public production against the private investment distortion created by tax policy. In an
open economy, the private investment decision is distorted by a source-based investment tax. In a
closed economy, the prívate investmen[ decision is distorted by either a private investment tax or a
saving tax. Either tax produces a wedge between the gross re[urn of investment and the net-of-tax
return received by savers. On account of this tax wedge, the private cost of capital exceeds the
shadow cost of public capital. A difference between the private and public perceived costs of capital
14implies that tax policy distorts the private investment decision. To correct this distortion of private
investment, the government faces an incentive to expand the range of its production activities. In
particular, the govertunent will take on some activities where it has an absolute production
disadvantage. In this sense, the government sector will be "too large". More generally, the size of
the government sector is related positively to the invesmient tax wedge. It would be interesting to
test this implication of the model in future work.
The ievei oï investment taxes - and thus the size of the state production sector - may be
affected by tax competition in the international economy. With increased international capital
mobility, there appears to be more scope for international (invesunenq tax competition. As a result
of tax competition, perhaps. corporate income tax rates have been on a downward trend in
European countries. In Europe, the general lowering of corporate income tax rates has coincided
wi[h a trend towards privatizing government activities.
The analysis of this paper has focused on the relationship between capital income taxes and
the size of the government production sector. Analogously, one could consider the relationship
between labor income taxes and the size of the state sector. In this instance, the model predicts that
a formerly state-owned enterprise - after privatization - reduces its payroll. Privatizations indeed
seems to lead to reduced employment levels.
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16Appendix
Proof of Proposition L
(i) Ey. (12) implies that
d - (I - DI F(KR(DIl - (1 ' rl KR - ~F(K~i - (! ' rJ K~~ - ~
Note that with D- 0, we have d~ 0, as the private inves[ment, KP, is distorted by the
investment tax, v. To see Ihe result, note Iha[ d d I dD- - F(Kg (D~) ~ 0.
(ii) From (l2) and 6 1 0, we see that,
F(KR(D)1 -(1 ' r) K~(DJ ~ F(K~l -( ! ' ~) Kp
The result follows by noting that F(Ko) -(! r r) ~ o from (6).
(iii) Totalty differentiating (12), we find that,
dD
a'v
~F ~(Ko) - (1 ' r)] ldKpl dv)
~ D
F(KR(D)1
Proof of Proposition 3:
Detining 0 as
~ - (I - ~)P(Kr(r,ï)) - (1 t r - ~)1~4(ril) - ~F(K~ - (1 f r - !;)K,J - 0
with
1 (I - z) e~
~,- (~--i
r1 Pe,.e„
the proof is parallel to that for (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1.
17Endnotes
These figures are from Worldbank (1995). Table A.1, pp. 268-271. For a description of
covered government activities, see p. 26.
2. Galal, lones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1994) present thorough case studies of the generally
positive welfare consequences of divestitures in the United Kingdom, Chile, Malaysia and
Mexico.
Hari, Si~ieifer and 'vishrry (í996) presem a modei where con[ract incompÍeteness affects a
government's choice whether or not to privatize an activity, with an application to
prisans.
4. The assumption that the government has an absolute production advantage in some
activities does not affect the analysis.
5. In (9) the constraints on the profit tax rate, z, are ignored.
6. Note that it is possible that t) G 1 with optimally z - 0. This occurs if the profits that the
government obtains from running state firms with u- 0, v- 0, and D - o exceed the
corresponding optimal provision of public goods, G. In this instance, optimal policy implies
x ~ 0, v C 0 and o ~ 0, which implies that the state sector is "too small". This somewhat
irrealistic case ís ignored.
7. Consistent with the proposition, Bhaskar and Khan (1995) provide evidence that privatiza
tion of the jute industry in Bangladesh reduces employment with little change in output.
8. Note that (6) and (13) also imply that the marginal product of capital in the public sector,
i.e. (1 - w)F'(Kg(c~)) for ro s D, is less then the marginal product of capital in the
private sector, i.e. F'(Kp) . This simply reflects that the investment tax, v, distorts the
private investment decision.
9. The issue of tariff reform in a small open economy with public production has been
considered by Abe (1992).
]0. Note that with complete profit taxation, i.e. z- l, or no private projects to start with,
i.e. p infinitely large, the required returns on public and private investments are identical.
l8TABLE 1: MAPPING OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION ATTRIBUTES
INTO IMPACT VARIABLES
~~~.~,r~~~`~~'. .~..,;:tk~~'~~Y~},M'i
f or -: project t:all variables t:all variables t:all variables
duration, e.g.,distance, e.g., school., e.g.,agricult.
Pas'kfcrpat:` ' t or -: unit time, level of enrollment, productiv.,






}or-: tor-: tor-: tor-:
all variables all variables all variables all variables
t: all t: all t: all t: alI f:
variables variables variables variables empowerment
t: all t: all t: all t: all f:
variables variables variables variables empowerment
t: all t: all t: all t: income
variables variables variables equality









~ See section 2 for a list of specific variables en each group.
`' Degree of Participation is an Index constructed rating variables offunctional, intensity, and extent of
community participation (see tex[).
' We are referring here only to the interactive effects ofdecentraliza[ion and participation.
' We are referring here only to the interactive efTects ofthese specific project characteristics and
participation.Figure l: Investment levels in public
and private sectors
~ ~ ~
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